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ABSTRACT
A MODEL OF BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL LEARNING IN DYNAMIC GAMES
HAKAN AKSOY
MASTER OF ARTS IN ECONOMICS 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Erdem Başçı 
August, 1997
There are various computer-based algorithms about boundedly rational players’ 
learning how to behave in dynamic games, including classifier systems, genetic al­
gorithms and neural networks. Some examples of studies using boundedly rational 
players are Axelrod (1987), Miller (1989), Andreoni and Miller (1990) who use ge­
netic algorithm and Marimon etal. (1990) and Arthur (1990) who use classifier 
systems. In this dissertation, a Two Armed Bandit Problem and the Kiyotaki- 
Wright (1989) Economic Environment are constructed and the learning behaviour 
ol the boundedly rational players is observed by using classifier systems in computer 
programs. From the simulation results, we observe that experimentation and im­
itation enables faster convergence to the correct decision rules of players in both 
repeated static decision problems and dynamic games.
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DİNAMİK OYUNLARDA SINIRLI RASYONEL BİR ÖĞRENME MODELİ
HAKAN AKSOY
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Erdem Başçı 
Ağustos, 1997
Dinamik oyunlarda sınırlı rasyonel oyuncuların öğrenirken nasıl davranacağı hakkında 
bilgisayar destekli birçok algoritma vardır. Bunlardan bazıları sınıflandırma sis­
temleri, genetik algoritmalar ve nöral sistemlerdir.Örneğin Axelrod (1987), Miller
(1989) , Andreoni ve Miller (1990) ’in makalelerinde genetik algoritma, Marimon etal.
(1990) ve Arthur (1990) ’un makalelerinde de sınıflandırma sistemleri kullanılmıştır.
Bu tezde İki Kollu Haydut Problemi ve Kiyotaki ve Wright (1989) ’m makalesindeki 
ekonomi modeli oluşturulmuş ve bilgisayar programları ile sınıflandırma sistemleri 
kullanılarak oyuncuların öğrenebilirliği incelenmiştir. Dinamik oyunlarda deney yap­
manın ve toplumun tecrübelerinden yararlanmanın oyunculara doğru ve daha hızlı 
yakınsama yaptırdığı simülasyon sonuçlarından gözlenmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Dinamik Oyunlar, Sınırlı Rasyonellik, Sınıflandırma Sistem­
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1 Introduction
This dissertation is about learning how to behave. The economic environments stud­
ied here are quite complex, while the learning models considered are quite simplistic. 
Nevertheless, in three different example applications of increasing complexity, we ob­
serve convergence of behavior to the theoretical equilibrium.
An important class of economic decision problems are quite complex. The first 
type of complexity arises in situations where payoffs corresponding to some of the 
actions are random and moreover the players do not know much about the payoff 
probability distribution functions. A second type of complexity arises in dynamic 
problems where the actions taken now affect future conditions faced by the players. 
Yet, a third type of complexity arises due to the effects of player’s actions on other 
players’ payoffs, i.e. the game aspect. When all these three types of complexities 
are present in a model, it is usually called a stochastic dynamic game. If the same 
decison situations are faced again and again over time, the problem is said to have 
a recursive structure and may be called a recursive stochastic dynamic game.
In such a complex environment it may be too much to expect from the individual 
players to explain what happens in the whole system and hence, their behavior in 
general may be suboptimal. In an adaptive learning system, however, the actions of 
each player are assigned a value, such as performance, utility or strength and each 
player behaves so as to choose the higher valued actions, while updating these values 
with the help of experience.
A wide range of computer-based adaptive algorithms exists for exploring such be­
havior, including classifier systems, genetic algorithms, neural networks, and similar 
reinforcement learning mechanisms. Some examples of studies using adaptive play­
ers are Axelrod (1987), Miller (1989), Andreoni and Miller (1990) who use genetic
algorithm and Marimon etal. (1990) and Arthur (1990) who use classifier systems.
In this thesis, we concentrate on classifier systems as a boundedly rational, adap­
tive learning device in three different economic environments. The classifier systems 
have been introduced in the artificial intelligence literature by Holland (1975) as 
a model of human brain that could enable machines to “decide” and “learn” . A 
classifier system is a collection of rules together with their strengths. Each rule is 
a “condition-action” or an “if-then” statement. In a decision situation, the rules 
whose condition parts are satisfied are said to be activated. Out of all the activated 
rules, each may give contradictory advices on how to act. Therefore to be selected, 
they compete by bidding their strengths. The classifiers with higher bids are se­
lected more often, however the selection criteria for winning clasifiers have varied in 
the literature (See Arthur, 1990 and Marimon etal, 1990 for two different selection 
criteria, also see Sargent, 1994).
In the next section we review the literature on money as a medium of exchange 
with emphasis on the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) paper, which will be the underlying 
economic environment in section four.
In section 3, we consider the so called two armed bandit problem as a demonstra­
tion of the performance of classifier systems in repeated static decison situations. In 
a two armed bandid problem, there are two arms A and B which a player can pull. 
In our setup, arm A yields a deterministic utility payoff of 5 units, while arm B yields 
a utility payoff of 1000 units with probability 1 percent and 0 units with probability 
99 percent. Clearly a rational and fully informed player would choose always arm 
B, since it provides higher expected utility. There is also a Bayesian literature on 
how a rational player, who does not know the payoff structure but needs to experi­
ment according to his priors, should act. In the first part, we present the recursive
least squares learning technique and will use this approach in all of the computer 
programs. In the second part, we construct the algorithm for the two armed bandit 
problem by using boundedly rational players with classifier systems as a learning 
device. The contribution here is that we allow both imitation and experimentation 
and observe the speed of learning for different imitation probabilities.
In section 4, we consider the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model of money as a 
medium of exchange and make theoretical calculations of three classes of rational 
players’ behaviours. Our calculations show that the good with lowest storage cost 
plays the role of medium of exchange under “fundamental equilibrium” parame­
ters. Similarly, the lowest and highest storage cost goods play the role of medium 
of exchange under “speculative equilibrium” parameters. We first try to observe 
the performance of classifier systems in a simple dynamic optimization problem. In 
this model we consider a finite number of unexperienced players facing an infinite 
number of learned players. Again, experimentation and various degrees of imitation 
of the finite reference group are allowed for. Next we construct the Kiyotaki-Wright 
economic environment as a dynamic game with a finite number of players, all unex­
perienced in the begining. Finally, we present the algorithm of the game and study 
the presence of convergence to the so called “fundamental” and “speculative” equi­
libria again by allowing experimentation and imitation in classifier systems. In this 
section, also a 100 independent simulations are run with no imitation, half imitation 
and full imitation, to observe the convergence rates.
The last section summarizes and interprets the results in light of the previous 
results in the literature, a brief account of which is given below.
2 Models of Money as a Medium of Exchange
The Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) paper is an attempt to capture the transactions 
demand for money. Due to the nature of trading arrangements, when two players 
meet, there is a ‘mutual inconsistency of needs’ and hence at least one of them has 
to accept an item, which will not be consumed immediately, in a trade round. In 
this model, media of exchange out of the three storable commodities are determined 
endogenously as part of the noncooperative equilibrium. When a commodity is 
accepted in trade, not for consumption purposes, but for facilitating future trade, 
that commodity acts as money in the model.
The Kiyotaki and Wright (KW) environment introduces trading frictions by its 
market structure. There is no central clearing house, but players in each period 
are matched randomly with one other player from the population. If they mutually 
agree to trade, they swap their endowments, which is always one unit of one of the 
three commodities available. The three commodities have different storage costs. 
Under a certain range of parameters, the unique Nash-Markov equilibrium turns 
out to be the one in which only the the commodity with the lowest storage cost acts 
as a medium of exchange. This equilibrium is called “the fundamental equilibrium” . 
For an other range of parameters, the unique equilibrium consists of both the lowest 
and highest storage cost commodities being accepted and circulated as media of 
exchange. This one is called “the speculative equilibrium” .
Related previous models in the literature include the framework of Jones (1976) 
where many commodities circulate as media of exchange, the paper by Iwai (1988), 
where expectations are fully rational but players are able to choose only simple 
trading patterns, studies in sequential bargaining theory, such as Mortensen (1982), 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), and Gale (1986) which have a similar mathcing
structure to the KW paper.
Kehoe, Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) extend the KW model to allow mixed strategy 
equilibria and dynamic equilibria. They show that steady-state equilibria always 
exist in mixed-strategies and new mixed-strategy steady-state equilibria can arise 
when there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium.
Yiting Li (1995) analyzes the informational frictions on the choice of commodity 
money in an economy with specialized production and consumption.People do not 
recognize the commodity, when they do not produce or consume it. He also analyzes 
the effect of private information on the interaction between players’ willingness. 
There exists an equilibrium in which the lowest storage cost commodity serves as 
the unique commodity money. A related study by Cuadras-Morato (1994) also 
introduces private information into the Kiyotaki-Wright model, however he considers 
different questions.
Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent (1990) use artificially intelligent players to 
examine the equilibria that arise in Kiyotaki-Wright economic environment. Their 
players use a common classifier system to make their decisions. In their paper they 
try two different classifier systems. A complete enumaration of all possible rules is 
carried along in the first kind of classifier system. In the second kind of classifier 
system, a modified version of the genetic algorithm of Holland is used. In this case, 
some rules are eliminated and new rules are injected into the population of rules. 
They do not allow for experimentation. As a result, in the case of “fundamen­
tal equilibrium” they observe convergence to Nash strategies, while in the case of 
“speculative equilibrium” convergence is not attained.
Lettau and Uhlig (1993) study the relationships between classifier systems and dy­
namic programming. For solving stochastic dynamic optimazation problems, there
are similarities and diiferences between classifier systems and dynamic programming. 
In some situations a classifier system may not converge to the optimal solution, al­
though it is reachable and may not settle down on a strict ranking of its classifiers. 
These results are robust and hint the differences between dynamic programing and 
classifier systems. However, their setting does not allow for experimentation or any 
kind of randomness in selecting among the activated classifiers.
Brown (1995) is an interesting experimental examination of Kiyotaki and Wright’s 
model (1989) of how money can arise as a medium of exchange. His laboratory re­
sults with economics students indicate that individuals tend to utilize one of the 
goods as a medium of exchange however, there are some deviations from the pre­
dicted patterns, even after 50 rounds of trade. He does not allow for communication 
and experience sharing between his subjects.
In our simulations a high proportion (usually 100 percent) of each type of players 
converge to a stationary equilibrium even if players start with random rules. When 
we get a stationary equilibrium in Kiyotaki-Wright environment, our simulations 
show that each good with low storage costs play the role of medium of exchange 
under “fundamental equilibrium” parameters. Similarly, the lowest and highest 
storage cost play the role of medium of exchange under “speculative equilibrium” 
parameters, which is consistent with the theoretical equilibrium. However, the speed 
of convergence in the latter case is rather low.
Our simulations, in general, show that in order to reach the theoretical equilib­
ria, experimentation, where each individual player makes a mistake, is neccessary. 
Moreover, imitation, where each individual player considers the value of accumulated 
social experience, speeds up the convergence process.
3 A Two Armed Bandit Problem
The simplest repeated static decision problem with unkown random payoffs is per­
haps the two armed bandit problem. In our two armed bandit problem, players 
will have two choices, choosing action A or choosing action B. When players choose 
action A, they get utility 5. Choosing action B yields either a utility of 1000 with 
1 percent probability or a utility of 0 with 99 percent probability. Clearly action 
B provides a higher expected utility. In this section we study the performance of 
classifier systems as a boundedly rational learning device. The insights developed in 
this section will help in understanding the performance of classifier systems under 
more complex environments.
3.1 Recursive Least Squares Learning via Classifier Sys­
tems
Let us consider an economic player, facing observations of a random return «<, who 
does not know its mean, ¡x. How would the player estimate //? One popular method 
would be just to take the equally weighted average of the observed returns. This 
gives nothing but the familiar ordinary least squares estimate of the mean. It is 
well known that this will be an optimal thing to do, provided that the returns are 
independent and identically distributed over time, no reliable prior information on ¡x, 
is available i.e. the prior is flat. In case a reliable prior probability density function 
for fx is available, the prior mean should be combined with the mean of observations 
with ‘appropriate’ weights. But what if the player lacks this Bayesian training, or 
does not have an idea about the data generating process?
As an alternative ad-hoc learning rule, the player can use the recursive least
squares formulation suggested in Sargent (1994): 
üt ■ üt-\ +  (l/i)('U( — ü(_i)
where is the estimate of mean /i at time t. It should be noted that if t starts from 
1, the initial condition, uq, is cancelled out at time 1, and hence is not important. 
In this case one can easily verify that at each time,
üi = ( i / i ) E U u.
i.e., just the sample mean.
If, however t starts from 2, the initial value, Ui, only exponentially goes to zero, 
hence it matters. In this case, it stands for the prior mean in the Bayesian approach, 
hence it will be consistent with Bayesian update starting with some prior density.  ^
Throughout the thesis, this approach of starting at i = 2 will be adopted, in order 
to allow for heterogeneity of initial values across players.
The two armed problem, however, has a further complication. There are two 
different actions with different returns and learning goes together with performance. 
This aspect makes the problem interesting and difficult.
By using the recursive least squares learning approach, strength of chosing action 
A will be updated by the formula,
S A ,  =  S A , . ,  -  -  5)
and experience counter of choosing action A will be updated as,
^This update scheme is a special case of the general stochastic approximation method of Robbins 
and Manro (1951) and hence convergence to the population mean will be attained. See Sargent 
(1994, pp. 39-42) for details.
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tA — 1·
For players who choose action B, the strength will be updated with 1 percent prob­
ability as,
SBt, =  SBt,-r -  ^{SBt^ -  1000) 
or, with 99 percent probability as,
SB,. = S B ,, . ,  -  ¿(SB ,.)
and experience counter of choosing action B will be updated as,
tB — tn +  1.
3.2 Computer Algorithm and Simulation Results
The algorithm below involves three possible cases for decision making; normal, im­
itation and experimentation. In the normal case, each player decides using their 
own strengths of actions A and B. In the imitation case each player decides by using 
the social strengths for that time. Social strengths are calculated by using previous 
period’s experience weighted average strength values of the society. In the experi­
mentation case each individual player makes their decision randomly.The algorithm 
is.
Repeat until the last period.
Repeat until all the players chose their actions.
If there is no experimentation,
If there is no imitation,
If Strength of A is greater than Strength of B, 
choose action A otherwise choose action B.
If there is imitation,
if Social Strength of A is greater than Social Strength of B, 
choose action action A otherwise choose action B.
If there is experimentation, 
with 50 percent probability, 
choose action A, 
with 50 percent probability, 
choose action B.
If action A is chosen,
update the strength and experience counter of choosing action A, 
otherwise
update the strength and experience counter of choosing action B. 
Update the Social Strength of choosing action A 
with respect to the previous period.
Update the Social Strength of choosing action B 
with respect to the previous period.
(see Appendix A for the full Gauss Program)
10
Without experimentation players may not ever try an action. For example, if 
initial strength of choosing action A is greater than initial strength of choosing ac­
tion B and initial strength of choosing action B is smaller than 5, player will always 
choose action A which has the lower return. Experimentation gives a chance to 
investigate different tastes and imitation helps for rapid convergence to the correct 
mode of behavior. We use the strength update scheme,
Zt — Z t - \  {j){zt — Z t - l )  
or.
Zt+1 -  (1 -  J^)zt + i-t-1
Zt+2 (1 ¿_j_2 d” (i+2' *^+2)i
Z<+2 -  (1 -  +  (¿2^t-|-2)
+  (i+2^‘+l) +  (<+2 ‘^+2)<
Zt+n =  {j^Zt)  +  irr=l Zt i^).
It should be noted that as n increases, the importance of initial strength Zt on 
diminishes.
As n goes to infinity, convergence to the correct mean return parameter will be 
attained. For example assume that.
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t is equal to 100,
=  6
zt+i =  5 for г > 1
5.05 > 2i+n if n > 2,000
5.005 > if n > 20,000
or if the initial strength t were larger, e.g. t is equal to 1000,
5.05 > Zt+n if n > 20,000
5.005 > if n > 200,000.
With experimentation, whatever the initial strengths will be, convercenge to cor­
rect strength values will be satisfied. With imitation, this will happen rather fast. 
Expected return from choosing action A is equal to,
E{cA) =  5*1  
=  5
and expected return of choosing action В is equal to,
E{cB) =  (1000 *.01) +  (0*.99)
= 10.
In our simulations, in the beginning 50 percent of players choose action A and 
50 percent of players choose action В because of their given initial strengths. Even­
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tually, all the players end up choosing action B to get the highest utility. Social 
strength of choosing action A converges to 5 and social strength of choosing ac­
tion B converges to 10. If we change the utility of choosing action B under good 
state of nature from 1000 to 100, expected return from choosing action B will fall to,
E{cB)  =  (100*.01) + (0*.99)
=  1.
In this case the players choose action A to get the highest utility. Imitation also 
increases the speed of convergence. From the simulation results of the program, low 
imitation is observed to result in slow convergence, while high imitation leads to fast 
convergence.(see Appendix A for the Output)
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4 Learning to use Money as a Medium of Ex­
change
We construct a physical environment like the model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) 
and observe the performance of classifier systems in a simple dynamic optimization 
problem. We consider a finite number of unexperienced players facing an infinite 
number of learned players. Then we let all the players be unexperienced. But first 
we recall the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model by using their own notation.
Time is discrete and continues forever, and at each date there are three indivis­
ible commodities called goods 1, 2, and .3. /3 denotes the discount factor which is 
any nonnegative number smaller than or equal to one. Infinitely lived players are 
in equal proportions of type 1, type 2, and type 3, and they are randomly matched 
in each trade round. Type i players get their utility only from the consumption of 
good i. When they consume, type 1 player produces good 2, type 2 player produces 
good 3 and type 3 player produces good 1. Players can store all the goods at a cost 
and one good at a time. Storage cost of good 3 is the highest and that of good 1 is 
the lowest for all types of players. The storage cost of good k for type i player will 
be Cik- Under our assumption, we can say that, ■
When type i player consumes good i and produces his good, he obtains utility Ui 
and disutility Di. Utility is always greater than disutility. So each player has a 
trading strategy and wants to get his own type of good for consumption and there­
fore get highest utility. Otherwise he would prefer to choose any good which has a 
low storage cost. For example, type 2 player always prefers good 2 first, and then
14
good 1, and good 3 last or type 3 player always prefers good 3 first, and then good 
1, and good 2 last, disregarding future trading opportunities. When type i player 
consumes good i and produces good k, the indirect utility will be.
^ U i -  Di +  Vik
or.
Vii — Uj “t" Vih
where m — Ui — Di and Vik is the indirect utility of holding good k before the next 
trade round.
By using the Bellman equation of dynamic programming (Bertsekas 1976), the 
indirect utility for type i of storing good k ^  i will be —Cik plus maximum of the 
expected value of next period’s indirect utility multiplied with discount factor.
In Kiyotaki-Wright (1989), pij is defined as the density of type i player storing 
good j. Since type i player will always consume good i, type i player will not store 
good i before a trade round, so that we can write,
P l2  +  P l 3  =  1?
P21 +  P23 =  1 and
P31 +  P32  =  1 ·
Type 1, type 2 and type 3 players are in equal propotions. The probability of 
type i player matching with any type of player is 1/3. If the players were concerned 
only with the storage costs and utilities, we would observe.
15
type 1 player storing good 2 trades for good 1 only,
type 1 player storing good 3 trades for good 1 or good 2,
type 2 player storing good 1 trades for good 2 only,
type 2 player storing good 3 trades for good 2 or good 1,
type 3 player storing good 1 trades for good 3 only,
type 3 player storing good 2 trades for good 3 or good 1.
The above pattern indeed emerges as an equilibrium the so called fundemantal equi­
librium for a certain set of parameter values. In speculative equilibrium, players may 
concern not only the present trade but also the future trades and may not behave 
myopic. To obtain these values we can carry out the analyses below which involves 
also the missing steps in the Kiyotaki-Wright theorems. Our indirect utilities will 
be, for type 1 player:
K2 =  —C12 +  +  |(P2l(^l +  ^12) +  P23l^O,x{Vi2 ·, +  ^^12]
Vi3 =  —Ci3 +  +  |Vi3 +  |(p3i(wi -t- V12) +  P32” ^oa:(Vi2 , V13))]
for type 2 player:
V21 =  -C21+/3[l{pi2{u2 + V23)+Pl3max{V2i,V23})+lV2i +  l{p3lV2i+P32{u2 +  V23))]
V23 = —C23 + /5[|V23 + 1^ 23 + \{P3l1^0,x{V2i·, V23) + 3^2(^2 + Hs))] 
for type 3 player:
^1 =  ~C3i+^[|(pi2maa:(V3i, V32)+pi3(u3-f V3i))-f|(p2i^i+P23(w3 +  V3i)) +  |V3i]
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Vs2 =  —C32 +  /5[|V32 +  |(p2i’^a3;(V3i, V32) +  P2z{^z +  ^ 1)) +  3^ 2]·
By using the equations for type 1 player written above, assume that V12 is greater 
than V13. Then;
hi2 =  —C\2 +  ^[|Vi2 +  |(p2i(^ii + V12) + P23V12) +  1^12]
V12 = —C\2 + l^ \\Vi2 + \iP2iUl + V12) + 5V12]
hl2 — •“ C12 +  P\Y\2 + 2 (p2li^l)] (1)
hi3 — —Ci3 + /^ [|143 +  3^ 13 +  3(p3i(wi +  V12) +  ^32^ 12)]
hi3 — —Ci3 +  + 2(P3i«i +  Vu)]·
After subtracting the two equations above,
hl2 — V\Z — Cl3 — C12 +  ^[|(Vl2 — V13) +  |(P21 — P3l)wi]
(1 “  3^)(^12 -  143) + (| (^P31 -  P2l)«l) =  Ci3 -  C12
(2)
Cl3 -  C12 > (| (^P31 -  P2l)wi).
If we assume.
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Cl3 ~  Ci2 >  (|/^(P31 — i> 2 l)w i),
we get,
- C l 2  >  (| ^ (P 3 1  -  P 2 l)w i) -  Ci3.
By using the equation (1),
Vi2 >  (| ^ (P 3 1  -  P2i ) m i ) -  Ci3 +  ^[V"i2 +  | (p 2 lW l)]
^12 ^  (| ^ P 3l'W l) — Ci3 +  ^ V i2  
^12 “  (| /^P 3lW i) — ^ V i2  ^  Ci3·
By using equation (2),
Vu — (|/^P3lWl) +  ^Vi2 +  ^[|Vl3 +  |(P3lWl +  V12)] ^  Vi3
Vi2 — ^Vi2 + /^[fKs + 3^12] ^ 1^3 
Vl2 + [^|Vi3 -  ¡Vn] > V^ 3
[1 -  m v u  > [1 -
since,
[1 -1 ^ ]  > 0
we get,
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V l2  >  ^13·
Therefore we can conclude that,
Cl3 ~ Ci2 > — P2l)wi) iff Vi2 > Vi3·
By using the equations for type 2 player,
V21 = —C2i+/?[|(pi2(w2 + V23)+Pi3i^oa;(14i) ^23))+  3I41 + 5(^ 31 ^ 21+^32(^ 2 +  143))]
2^3 =  —C23 +  /^ [|V23 +  1^ 23 + \{pz\fn0.x{V2\i V23) +  ^32(^ 2 + V23))]·
If we subtract them from each other,
V2I ~  ^23 =  —C2\ +  |/?[(P12(W2 +  V23) +  PlZ'^(ix{V2\i V23)) +  V2I +  (P3ll4 l 
+^32(^ 2 + 143))] +  C23 — 3^[143 ~ 143 ~ (p3i^ao;(V2i, V23) — ^32(^ 2 +  V23))]
14i ~  143 =  —C21 +  |/3[(pi2(rt2 +  V23) +  Pi3^oa;(V2i, V23)) +  14i +  (P3i l4 i)]
+C23 “  |/^ [143 “  143 ~ (P3iiriaa;(V2i, I43))]·
Since,
C23 -  C21 > 0 and ^[\{pi2U2)] >  0
14i “  14s ^  3^[(pi2l43) +  Pi3^<i^(14i 514s)) +  14i +  (P3i l4 i)j
-^\[V2Z -  143 -  (P3imaa:(14i, I43))]·
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Assuming that V23 is greater than V21,
V21 ~ V23 ^ |/?[^23 +  V21 +  PziV'ii — V23 — V23 ~ -^ 31^ 23]
( l - | ^ ( l + P 3 l ) ) ( V 2 1 - K 2 3 ) > 0 .
Since,
(1 -  |/3(1 + p3i)) > 0 
we get,
(V21 -  2^3) > 0.
So our supposition is wrong. Assuming that V21 is greater than V23,
V21 — V23 ^ |/^[pi2^3 +  Pi3^i + +  P31V21 — V23 ~ V23 —
Since,
Pi2^23 +  P13V21 > V23 
we get.
V21 -  V23 > im i -  V231
(1 -  |/9)(V2, -  V23) >  0.
We know that (1 — |^) > 0. Then our assumption holds;
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V21 > V23·
By using the equations for type 3 player,
V31 =  —C31+ /3[^{px2max{V3i, V32)+P l3 (ii3 +  h3l)) +  |(P2lh3 1 +P 2 3(w3 +  V3i)) +  |V3i]
V32 =  —C32 +  ^[|l^2 +  \{P2l‘>^0.x{Vii, V32) +  P23{'^3  +  1^ 31)) +  3I42]·
If we subtract them from each other,
V31 ~  V32 =  ~~C3i +  |^[(Pi2i^oa;(V3i, V32) + P i3 (w3 +  V31)) +  (^21^31 +^23(^3 +  ^31)) 
+  1^31] +  <^ 32 ~  |^[(Pl2l^2 + P l3 (w3 +  V31)) +  {P2l ‘max{V3iy V32) +  P23{u3 +  1^ 31)) +  V32]
Hi ~  H2 =  —C3I +  C32 +  |/5 [(Pi2^ 0 ’^(H i ) H2) +  Pl3 (u3 +  Hi))
+ (P2lHl) +  Hi “  P12H2 ~ Pl3(w3 +  Hi) ~ (P21^0x(Hl) H2)) “  H2]·
Since,
C32 -  C31 > 0 
we get.
Hi — H2 ^ ~[pi2i7iaa:(Hi, H2) +  P21H1 +  Hi ~ P12H2 ~ P2i” <^^3;(Hi) H2) — H2]·
Assuming that H 2 is greater than Hi,
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Vai — V32 > |/5[(p2i +  l ) (^ i  ~ H 2)]
(1 — 3^(1 “I” P2\)){y^\ ~  ^ 2) ^ 0
(V31 -  1^ 32) >  0.
So our supposition is wrong. But assuming that ^31 is greater than V32,
V31 — V32 >  |^[(pi2 +  l ) ( ^ i  ~  V32)]
(1 -  1^(1 +  Pi2))(14i -  V32) >  0 
we get,
V3I ^ Vi2·
Now our assumption holds. As a result, when we use the equations of V21,
V31 and Vi2·, we get the inequalities;
^ ^3 and
V31 >  V32 for all pij s.
Therefore for the equations of V12 and V13, to yield the fundamental equilibrium, 
the statement will be.
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Vi2 > Vi3 iff Ci3 -  Ci2 > (|^(P31 -  P2l)ui)·
If (|^(p3i — P2\)ui) > Ci3 — Ci2, we will have the same inequalities except the 
inequality which is V13 is greater than V12, so steady state equilibrium is changed 
and we get the speculative equilibrium.
In fundamental equilibrium, the steady state inventory distributions will be,
{Pi2,Pi3,p2i,P23,P3i,P32) =  (1,0,.5, .5,1,0).
(see Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989) Type 2 players trade good 3 for good 1 and all 
types of player wants get its own good. Good 1 is the unique medium of exchange 
and ty])c 2 player acts as a middleman. So we have a fundamental equilibrium iff 
ci3 -  C12 > .5^ui.
In speculative equilibrium, the steady state inventory distributions will be, 
(pi2,Pi3,P2i,P23,P3i,P32) = 1 — :^ /2  — /^2, \/2 — 1,1,0)
(see Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). In this case, we get /3ui) > C13 — C12 for 
speculative equilibrium. The difference from the fundamental equilibrium is that 
type 1 player uses good 3 as a medium of exchange as well. So type 1 player trades 
the low storage cost good 2 for the high storage cost good 3.
4.1 Learning Dynamic Optimization in a Stationary Envi­
ronment and in the Kiyotaki-Wright Model of Money
In our simulations of the Kiyotaki-Wright model of money as a medium of exchange, 
we consider two cases, first a finite number of unexperienced players facing an infinite 
number of learned players, second all unexperienced in the begining. We study the
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presence of convergence for both fundamental and speculative equilibrium parame­
ters and observe the effects of experimentation and imitation in classifier systems. 
By using the assumptions above to get the fundamental equilibria, the proportions 
of the learned players like in the theoretical part must be,
{pi2,Pl3',P21iP23,P31iP32) =  (1) 0, .5, .5,1,0), 
or we can write the following table.
BIST. OF INV. GOOD 1 GOOD 2 GOOD 3
TYPE 1 PLAYER 0 1 0
TYPE 2 PLAYER 0.5 0 0.5
TYPE 3 PLAYER 1 0 0
In the speculative equilibria, the proportions of the learned players like in the the­
oretical part must be,
{ P l 2 , P l 3 , P 2 1 , P 2 3 , P 3 1 , P 3 2 )  =  ( ^ 5   ^ “  1? I ’ O) ’
or we also can write the following table.
DIST. OF INV. GOOD 1 GOOD 2 GOOD 3
TYPE 1 PLAYER 0 0.707 0.293
TYPE 2 PLAYER 0.586 0 0.414
TYPE 3 PLAYER 1 0 0
As in the theoretical paper of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), the pairs of players 
who decide to trade, will exchange their good, afterwards if consumption does not 
take place, each player will pay the storage costs of their goods and wait for the
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next period’s matching and for the different trading offer, if consumption takes place, 
each player will produce their own good and be ready for the next period’s matching 
and trading round.
The logic of classifier systems is very simple, to do or not to do like in the two 
armed bandit example. If do strength is greater than do not strength, players will 
decide to carry out that action otherwise they will not.
In our simulation program, we have nine different possible trade states for each 
type of players. These are:
trade state 1 : trade good 1 in return to good 1,
trade state 2 : trade good 2 in return to good 1,
tradci state .3 : trade good 3 in return to good 1,
trade state 4 : trade good 1 in return to good 2,
trade state 5 : trade good 2 in return to good 2,
trade state 6 : trade good 3 in return to good 2,
trade state 7 : trade good 1 in return to good 3,
trade state 8 : trade good 2 in return to good 3,
trade state 9 : trade good 3 in return to good 3.
For each type of players, there are nine different do trade strengths and nine 
different no trade strengths. In each trade round, if do trade strength is greater than 
the no trade strength for each player, we update the do trade strengths with the 
experience of trading, because both players decided to trade in this case. Otherwise 
we update the no trade strengths under the experience of non-trading.
For each type of players, we have three different possible consumption states. 
These are:
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consumption state 1 : consume good 1, 
consumption state 1 : consume good 2, 
consumption state 1 : consume good 3.
For each type of players, there are three different do consumption strengths and 
three different no consumption strengths. In each consumption state, if do consump­
tion strength is greater than no consumption strength, we update the do consump­
tion strength and experience counter of consumption, otherwise we update the no 
consumption strength and experience counter of non-consumption. Like the trade 
case, players decide to consume or not by using their consumption strengths.
In our programs we have 20 players of each type. Hence there are 60 times 
18 trade and 60 times 6 consumption classifiers which is equal to 1440 classifiers 
altogether. Initial strengths are taken randomly from normal density with mean 
zero and standard deviation one. At the end of the program, after 1000 periods, 
players have some experience and can learn how to behave. From the results of the 
output, one can observe that the players who consider the social strengths learn 
faster.
In the fundamental equilibrium case, type 1 players have only good 2 in their 
stores. Hence they may not have enough experience in trading good 3. Since there 
is no good 3 in type 1 players’ storages, they also may not have enough experience in 
consuming or not consuming good 3. Type 2 players may not have enough experi­
ence for trading good 3 for good 2 because only type 1 players have good 2 and type 
1 players do not accept the offer of type 2 because of the differences in storage costs. 
Type 3 players do not have any good 2, so they may not have enough experience 
for trading good 2 and not consuming good 2. Each type of players do not want
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to trade their own kind of goods because they will consume and get the highest 
satisfaction without storing them. To have the convergence, disutiliy is important 
in consumption. If the players consume the wrong good, players can not get the the 
utility but will give the production cost named as disutility (compare with Marimon 
etal 1990 where they do not impose the disutility). As a result trade tables for 
fundamental equilibrium will be.
TRADE GOODl GOODl GOOD2 GOOD2 GOOD3 GOOD3
FOR GOOD2 GOOD3 GOODl GOOD3 GOODl GOOD2
TYPEl Player yes no don’t care don’t care
TYPE2 Player yes no yes don’t care
TYPE3 Player no yes don’t care don’t care
and consumption table will look like.
CONSUMPTION GOOD 1 GOOD 2 GOOD 3
TYPE 1 PLAYER yes no don’t care
TYPE 2 PLAYER no yes no
TYPE 3 PLAYER no don’t care yes
In the speculative equilibrium case, type 1 players may not have enough experi­
ence for trading good 3 for good 2 because the other type of players do not have 
any good 2 in their stores. Type 3 players do not have any good 2, so they may 
not have enough experience for trading good 2 and not consuming good 2. Again, 
no player will consume its own type of good. As a result trade table for speculative 
equilibrium will be,
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TRADE GOODl GOODl GOOD2 GOOD2 GOOD3 GOOD3
FOR GOOD2 GOOD3 GOODl GOOD3 GOODl GOOD2
TYPEl Player - - yes yes yes don’t care
TYPE2 Player yes no - - yes yes
TYPE3 Player no yes don’t care don’t care - -

















By using the settings described above, we have written the corresponding pro­
grams in Gauss.
4.2 Computer Algorithm and Simulation Results
The algorithm of this program simulates the dynamic optimiztion problem in a sta­
tionary environment and in Kiyotaki-Wright Economic Environment. In imitation 
case players make their decisions by using social strength for that time but do not 
adopt the social strength. Social strengths are calculated by using previous period’s 
experience weighted social average strength values over the same type of players. In 
the experimentation case each individual player makes the decision randomly. In 
the program, recursive least squares technique adopted to a dynamic programming 
setting is used for learning the correct strength values by update mechanism. At 
the first step, consumption strength update is calculated according to:
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CONSt+1 = C0NSt-:^^Q^^^iC0NSt-U + DisU + SC0ST-l3*TRADEt)
and
TCONSt+i = TCONSt +  1.
At the second step, trade strength update is calculated with the given consump­
tion strength:
TRADEt+i = TRADEt -  ttrade,+i {TRADEt -  CONSt+^)
and
TTRADEt+i = TTRADEt + 1.
The updating proceeds and may converge to some values after enough iterations. 
The technique is used for both do and not do strengths together. The algorithm 
then can be written as,
Repeat until the final round.
Repeat until all the players are matched with an player.
If there is imitation (trade),
If Social Do Trade Strength of Each Type of Player is greater 
than Social No Trade Strength of Each Type of Player, 
decide to offer trade otherwise decide not to offer trade 
else if there is no imitation (trade),
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If Do Trade Strength of Player is greater 
than No Trade Strength of Player,
decide to offer trade otherwise decide not to offer trade.
If there is experimentation (trade),
with 50 percent probability decide to do trade, 
with 50 percent probability decide not to trade.
If Consumption Flag is l,(i.e. consumed the last period) 
update the strength of do consume classifier and 
experience counter 
else if Consumption Flag is 0,
update the strength of no consume classifier and 
experience counter.
If each pair of players decide to offer trade, 
exchange the stored goods of individual pairs.
Trade Flag is 1.
If there is imitation (consumption),
If Social Do Consumption Strength of Each Type of Player is 
greater than Social No Consumption Strength of Each Type of Player, 
decide to consume otherwise decide not to consume 
else if there is no imitation (consumption),
If Do Consumption Strength of Player is greater than
No consumption Strength of Player,
decide to consume otherwise decide not to consume.
If there is experimentation,
with 50 percent probability decide to do consume.
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with 50 percent probability decide not to consume. 
If decided to consume,
type 1 player produces good 2, 
type 2 player produces good 3, 
type 3 player produces good 1.
Consumption Flag is 1 
else decided not to consume,
Consumption Flag is 0.
If Trade Flag is 1,
update the strength of do trade classifier and 
experience counter 
else if Trade Flag is 0,
update the strength of no trade classifier and 
experience counter.
Report the results.
(see Appendix B and C for the full GAUSS Program)
Theoretically, we would expect the decision of a type 1 player in trading good 2 for 
good .3, be “NO” in fundamental equilibrium but “YES” in speculative equilibrium. 
In fundamental equilibrium type 1 players do not want to accept good 3 for good 2 
because the storage costs’ difference is large relative to utility from consuming own 
good. In speculative equilibrium type 1 players starts to exchange good 3 for good 
1 with type 3 players. Good 1 is highly desirable for type 1 players and in order to 
enable this exchange good 3 becomes also desired for high utility values. For this
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reason, type 1 players use good 3 as a medium of exchange and transfers form type 
2 players to type 3 players. In fundamental equilibrium however, good 1 is the only 
medium of exchange as expected because good 1 has the lowest storage cost, (see 
Appendix B and Appendix C for the Output)
Our simulation results indicate that the higher the imitation rate, the faster is 
the convergence. The inventory stok distributions also become more similar to the 
theoretical distributions when the imitation rate is increased.
The finite number of unexperienced players facing an infinite number of learned 
players are observed to converge to correct decisions faster than their counterparts 
in the program with all unexperienced players, (compare the results in Appendix 
D and in Appendix E) The players who face with the learned players obviously can 
learn the system better than the players who face with the unexperienced players.
Regarding experimentation, taking actions that may look like mistakes indeed 
may help discovering higher rewards. That is why even without imitation, we observe 
convergence, despite slow to the expected equilibrium behavior. Imitation is the tool 
for bringing together the collective experience and hence introducing it speeds up 
the rate of convergence in all of our simulations. However it is also observed that 
increasing imitation rate to 100 percent may also hurt in some cases as far as speed 
of convergence is concerned.
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5 Summary and Discussion of the Results
From the two armed bandit problem, we observe that the mistakes of each player 
cause finding better opportunities and lead to convergence to the correct decisions 
which give the highest utility. Since the percentage of players’ mistakes is bounded 
by a small number, no instability in the system is caused. We also observe that 
imitation increases the speed of convergence. In the imitation case, the higher the 
probability of imitation, the faster is the convergence. With the results in light of 
this section, we try to observe the behavior of the bounded rational players in a 
more complicated system which is Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model of money as 
a medium of exchange.
First we construct a model in which a finite number of players face an infinite 
number of learned players. This makes the model simple in the first step, so we can 
construct and test our simulation program in a less complicated environment. In 
this case, we see that imitation increases the speed of convergence and the players 
learn how to behave and converge to the expected decisons from a low proportion 
of players’ mistakes. To observe the robustness of the convergence results, 100 
independent Monte-Carlo simulations are run over a 1000 time periods. By using 
the parameter values in line with theoretical part, we get the fundamental and 
speculative equilibria settings. All types of players learn how to consume their 
type of goods and not to consume other types of goods. In both of the equilibria, 
players first want to trade for their own good, if this is not possible, they prefer the 
low storage cost good. The simulation results provide us approximately the same 
inventory distributions as expected from the decisions of players at the theoretical 
fundamental and speculative equilibria, (see Appendix D)
Finally, we constructed the final model, the real Kiyotaki-Wright economic envi­
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ronment as a dynamic game with a finite number of players, all unexperienced in 
the begining. To observe the robustness of the convergence results as in the previous 
part, 100 independent Monte-Carlo simulations are run over a 1000 time periods. 
The speed of convergence is observed to decrease in most cases beacuse none of 
the players know how to behave in the beginning unlike in the previous case. We 
also observe that imitation increases the speed of convergence and the players learn 
how to behave and converge to the correct decisons under a bounded percentage of 
players’ mistakes. Like in the dynamic stationary case, we get approximately the 
theoretical inventory distributions. In the fundamental equilibrium setting, type 2 
player is observed to act as the middleman, transferring good 1 from type 3 player 
to type 1. Good 1 is the medium of exchange and acts as money. In the speculative 
case, type 1 players start to exchange good 2 for good 3 even if the storage cost of 
good 2 is lower than the good 3. Since the utility of consuming own good is very 
high with respect to the storage costs’ differences in the speculative equilibria, type 
1 players ignore the difference of the storage cost of good 2 to the storage cost of 
good 3 and start to transfer good 3 from player 2 to player 3. As a result type 1 
players consume their own good more than before by transferring good 3. In this 
case, good 3 also acts as a medium of exchange, (see Appendix E)
In Brown’s (1996) laboratary study, with human subjects where no imitation is 
allowed, students react but are far from equilibrium and exhibit convergence with 
more iterations. If we contrast our computer simulation with Brown (1996)’s, his 
experimental results are in line with our findings.
In summary, our simulations show that in order to approach the theoretical equi­
libria, a small probability of experimentation is necessary. Moreover imitation in­
creases the speed of convergence process.
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APPENDIX A
Program and Results of Two Armed Bandit Part:
1. Computer Program
2. Output: Full Imitation Case
3. Output: No Imitation Case
/* This program simulates the repeated static decision problem called the ♦/
/♦ two armed bandit problem ♦/
/* In imitation case, each agent decides by using social
strengths for the previous t but does not adopt the social strength 
for the future use ♦/
TIMEHUH=3000; /* Number of periods*/
N1=30; /* Number of agents who choose A or B */
N=2*N1; /* Number of players */
uA=5; /* Utility of action A */
uBg=1000; /* Utility of action B under good state of nature
(probability pgood) */
uB=0; /* Utility of action B under bad state of nature
(probability (1-pgood)) ♦/
pgood=0.01; /* probability of good state of nature */
pimit=i; /♦ probability of imitation ♦/
pexp=0.05; /* probability of experimentation ♦/
SAHPLE=20; /* number of seunples over the time period ♦/
/♦ initialization */
/* strength of A */
/* initial strength of A is recorded ♦/
/* number of times action A is chosen ♦/
/* strength of B */
/* initial strength of B is recorded */
/* number of times action B is chosen */
/* social strength of A, avg. value ♦/
/* social strength of B, avg. value ♦/
/* proportion over time of players playing A ♦/ 


















do while i<N+l; 
if rndud ,l)<(l“pexp) ; 
if rndud ,l)<(l-pimit) ; 

















/* within subseimple counter */ 
/* subsample counter ♦/
/♦no experimentation ♦/ 
/♦no imitation ♦/
/♦ end of if loop for choosing an action ♦/ 
/♦ imitate ♦/






SA[i]=SA[i] - ( 
TA[i]=TA[i]+l; 
else;




















/♦ end of if loop for choosing an action ♦/ 
/* end of experimentation */
(l/(TA[i]+l))*(SA[i]-uA) ); /* strength update */ 
/♦ if A is chosen */
/♦ if B is chosen ♦/
( (l/(TB[i]+l))*(SB[i]-uBg) );
(l/(TB[i]+l))*(SB[i]-uB) );
/♦ end of strength update in case B is chosen ♦/
/* next agent */
/* end of while loop for players ♦/
/♦ social strength of A, avg. value ♦/ 
/♦ social strength of B, avg. value */
/♦end of while loop for time+/
III
WITH IMITATION
In imitation case, each agent make their decision by using social 
strength for that time but do not change their strength.
Final Date 3000.0000
Initial number of players choosing each action (A or B) 30.000000
Number of players 60.000000
Utility of choosing action A 5.0000000
Utility of choosing action good state of nature 1000.0000
Utility of choosing action bad state of nature 0.0000000
probabilty of good state of nature 0.010000000
probability of imitation 1.0000000
probability of experimentation 0.050000000
number of sampling period 20.000000
difference of SA-SB at final time -2.1296444 -3.7860205
-4.5056391 -6.8979836 -5.1759589 -8.8486555
-5.8634434 -6.5610478 -5.8680788 -5.1625414
-5.5398646 -9.6143338 -6.1905805 -5.2107810
-1.4235527 -6.5658564 -4.8081670 -2.4120043
-1.7130796 -5.8587858 -7.9179592 -3.1495039
-6.8678620 -4.8345454 -1.7934761 -5.9089477
-8.0010494 -5.8999833 -3.1778632 -3.8181984
-5.6303659 -6.9987973 -2.8220419 -6.6060722
-0.46051726 -1.5028314 -5.2871950 -3.5001074
-3.5250518 -4.5699624 -3.5682656 -6.6350652
-6.6226480 -4.8799844 -5.6454878 -7.6489908
-4.8512179 -4.2078787 -3.8825283 -2.5445485
-2.8849988 -5.5430083 -5.2025248 -7.0030495
-3.8761107 -5.2173518 -5.9306027 -3.8985376
-5.9188635 -11.742569 
social strength of A at final time 
social strength of B at final time 
time plot of proportion of players who
5.0393013 
10.108693 
choose action A at some intei
0.30000000 0.21666667 0.21666667 0.11666667
0.050000000 0.050000000 0.083333333 0.033333333
0.033333333 0.050000000 0.050000000 0.050000000
0.016666667 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
IV
WITHOUT IMITATION
In imitation case, each agent make their decision by using social 
strength for that time but do not change their strength.
Final Date 3000.0000
Initial number of players choosing each action (A or B) 30.000000
Number of players 60.000000
Utility of choosing action A 5.0000000
Utility of choosing action good state of nature 1000.0000
Utility of choosing action bad state of nature 0.0000000
probabilty of good state of nature 0.010000000
probability of imitation 0.0000000
probability of experimentation 0.050000000
number of seunpling period 20.000000
difference of SA-SB at final time -11.791525 4.9107939
-6.1768357 4.9237873 -10.971713 -9.6060207
4.9247869 -9.5082631 4.9121513 -6.1554314
-5.4661359 4.9294238 4.9134689 -5.3275524
-4.1948712 -4.4981965 4.9093947 4.9217082
-1.5237694 4.9257612 -9.9293472 -9.6024324
4.9000040 4.9237873 0.21131464 -4.7776604
0.32272428 4.9357836 -3.8563881 4.9016995
-4.7301709 -11.536632 -5.1976191 4.8390498
-4.2605807 4.8670083 -3.2593265 4.8826958
4.8783912 -5.6097792 -9.0541665 4.8854005
-5.5506624 4.8670083 -7.7278558 4.8532820
-6.3957138 -6.5717864 4.8737598 0.27726070
0.010460660 -6.6780990 -6.4988753 -5.4307473
-7.7364113 -2.5214485 4.8826958 -4.7691550
4.8721369 4.8783912
social strength of A at final time 5.0014981
social strength of B at final time 10.413728
time plot of proportion of players who choose action A at some inter
0.91666667 0.88333333 0.86666667 0.86666667
0.81666667 0.80000000 0.75000000 0.71666667
0.68333333 0.66666667 0.65000000 0.60000000
0.58333333 0.56666667 0.51666667 0.50000000
0.48333333 0.48333333 0.48333333 0.46666667
V
APPENDIX B
Programs and Results of Dynamic Optimization Part:
When we look at the table of outputs for trade and consumption, we get 
the proportion of players who decide to do action at the last time period. In 
the trade table, i-j means trade for good i in return to good j. For example, 
when we look at the row for type 1 player and column for 2-3, we get the 
proportion of type 1 players who decide to do trade good 2 in return to good
3. In the consumption table, the rows give us the type of players and columns 
give us the type of goods. In the stok table, the distribution of holding goods 
for each type of players is given.
1. Computer Program: Fundamental Equilibrium
2. Output: Fundamental Equilibrium and Full Imitation Case
3. Output: Fundamental Equilibrium and No Imitation Case
4. Computer Program: Speculative Equilibrium
5. Output: Speculative Equilibrium and Full Imitation Case
6. Output: Speculative Equilibrium and No Imitation Case
VI
/* This progreim simulates the Kiyotaki-Wright Economy with artificially 
intelligent players
Distinguishing features:
- Production costs present (cf. Harimon etal.1990)
- Mistake or experimentation present at 2.5*/, probability.
- Imitation as occationally acting according to 
social strengths (with probability pimit).
- Social strengths are experience weighted average individual 
strengths over a type of players calculated before every 
trade decision.
-* In strength updates if agent has imitated, social strengths
of the following decision are used rather than individual strengths.
- Imitation in consumption classifiers as well
- Incorporates only the fundcunental equilibrium (i.e. only good 
one is used as medium of exchange.
Reporting facilities;
“ At each time, for each type, pre-trade stock distribution is recorded 
in matrix SDIST (T by 9) (1-3: first type, goods 1-3,
4-6: second type, goods 1-3,
7-9: third type, goods 1-3)
- At each time, for each type and each state, consumption 
decision distribution is recorded in matrix
CDIST (T by 9) (1-3: first type, goods 1-3, do consume perc.
4-6: second type, goods 1-3, do consume perc.
7-9: third type, goods 1-3, do consume perc.)
- At each time, for each type and each state, trade 
decision distribution is recorded in matrix
TDIST (T by 27) (1-9: first type, states 1-9, do trade perc.
10-18: second typo, states 1-9, do trade perc.
19-27: third type, states 1-9, do trade perc.)*/
N1=20; /* Number of players of each type (select as even) ♦/
N=3*N1; /* The total number of players ♦/
ref=ones(Nl,1)|(Nl+l)*ones(Nl,1)|(2*Nl+l)*ones(Nl,1);
/* for referencing purposes */
beta=0.6; /* The discount factor (select between zero and one) */
pr=0.05; /* The probability of mistake */
pim=l; /Imitation*/
pimit=pim*ones(l,N); /* Homogeneous */



















/* The N by 3 matrix of utilities */ 
/* The inventory holding costs */ 





C2=c21*ones(Nl ,l)*'c22+ones(Bl ,l)~c23*ones(Nl,l); 
C3=c31*ones(Hl,1)~c32*ones(Hl,1)"c33+ones(Nl,1);
C=CllC2|C3; /* The H by 3 matrix of costs
/* Initial strengths will be random */
SD0TR=rndn(N,9);
*/
/* The strengths of players^ do trade 
classifiers (3x3=9 states) */
/* Times used ♦/
/♦ The strengths of players^ don^t trade 
classifiers */
/* Times used ♦/
/♦ The strengths of players’ do consume 
classifiers (3 states) ♦/
/* Times used */
/♦ The strengths of players’ don’t consume 
classifiers ♦/
/♦ Times used */
ST0K=2*onesOll,1)I3*ones(Hl,1)Iones(Hl,1); /* The beginning pre-trade
inventory vector ♦/
STOKC=ones(N,1); /* Pre-consumption inventory held ♦/
CNS=zeros(N,1); /♦ Host recent consumption indicator. Consumed=l Not=0 */
FINALD=1000; /♦ Final date —  Number of times market opens */














/* The stock distribution recorder ♦/
/♦ Starting distribution of inventories */
/* The do consume percentage recorder */ 
/♦ The do trade percentage recorder ♦/ 
/* Initialization part complete. Now the market opens */
/♦ The main loop running over time index t. ♦/
t=0;
do while t<(FINALD); 
t=t+l; 
i=l;
do while i<N+l; /* i will be matched with a ’learned’ agent */
rtype=rndu(l,l); /♦ (FUNDAHENTAL EQH) ♦/
if rtype<l/3;
ltype=l; /♦ first type always comes with good 2 */
lstock=2; 
elseif rtype<2/3;
ltype=2; /* second typo comes with either good 1 (50*/,) */
if rndud ,1)< .5 ; 
lstock=l;




ltypo=3; /♦ third type always comes with good 1 ♦/ 
lstock=l; 
endif;




/* offer decisions. 
/* Pre-trade ♦/
/♦ he will always carry good 2 (pre-trade) */ 
/♦ say ‘yes^ only if partner comes with good 1
/♦ he will either carry (pre-trade) ♦/
/* good 1 */
/♦ (says ^yes’ only if partner comes with good 1) */
/♦ he will always carry good 1 (pre-trade) ♦/











elseif lstock==3; /* or good 3 */ 
if ( (ST0K[i]==l) or (ST0K[i]==2) );









/♦ First, the possibility of imitation ♦/ 
if rndud ,l)<pimit[i] ; /* If decides to look around */
/♦ For this state, he emulates the weighted average 







STRADE1=S0CNT; /* Trade strength —  default: social no trade */ 




else; /* No imitation —  own strengths */
STRADE1=SN0TR[i,STATEl]; /* Trade strength —  default: no trade ♦/
/* Now trade offer decisons will be made. Note the^bias towards 
trade in case of equality of strengths ♦/ 
if SD0TR[i,STATEl]>= SN0TR[i,STATEl];
TRADE1=1; /♦ First agent decides */
STRADEl=SDOTR[i,STATEl]; /* Trade strength —  change : do trade */
endif; 
endif;
/* Now the possibility of non-deliberate decision */ 
if rndud ,l)<pr; /* Random choice: Agent i ♦/ 
if rndud,1X0.5;
TRADE1=1; /* 50 percent trade */
STRADEl=SDOTR[i,STATEl]; 
else;
TRADE1=0; /♦ 50 percent no trade */
STRADEl=SNOTR[i,STATEl];




/* Now strength update of consumption classifiers will be made */ 
if t>l; /* Start update at time 2, since no consumption
decision is made for t=l yet. ♦/

























/♦ Now the consumption decision will be made ♦/
/* (Note the bias towards consuming in case of equal strengths ♦/
/♦ First, the possibility of imitation (consumption strengths) ♦/ 
if rndud ,lXpimit[i] ; /* If decides to look around ♦/
/♦ For this state (commodity), he acts according to the weighted average 








SC0NS1=S0CNC; /♦ Consumption strength —  default: social no consume ♦/ 
CNS[i]=0;
ST0K[i]=ST0KC[i]; /♦ Same stock ♦/
if S0CDC>=S0CNC; /♦ Decision according to social values ♦/
SC0NS1=S0CDC; /♦ Consumption strength —  change: social no consume ♦/ 
CNS[i]=l;
if i<=20; /♦ first type */
ST0K[i]=2; /* type 1 produces 2 ♦/
elseif i<=40; /♦ second type ♦/
ST0K[i]=3; /♦ type 2 produces 3 ♦/
else; /♦ third type ♦/
ST0K[i]=l; /* type 3 produces 1 ♦/
/♦ If exchange takes place ♦/ 
/♦ else, prev. stocks 





else; /* no imitation */
if SDOCNS[i,STOKC[i]]>=SNOCNS[i,STOKC[i]] ;
CHS[i]=l; /* do consume */
SCOHSl=SDOCNS[i,STOKC[i]]; /* its value (strength) */
if i<=20; /* first type ♦/
ST0K[i]=2; /* type 1 produces 2 */
elseif i<=40; /* second type */
/♦ type 2 produces 3 ♦/
/* third type ♦/











/♦ Now the possibility of non-deliberate decision */ 
if rndu(l,l)<pr; /* Random choice: Agent i */ 
















/* Now, update of trade classifier strengths */ 







TNOTR [i, STATEl] =TN0TR[i, STATEl]+1; 
endif;
i=i+l; /♦ Next agent... ♦/
endo;
/* Now records for reporting purposes */
/* Stock distribution ♦/
/♦ Same stock */
/♦ its value (strength) ♦/
/* don^t consume ♦/ 
/* its value (strength) */ 
/♦ Same stock */
/* do consume */
/* its value (strength) ♦/ 
/* first type */
/* type 1 produces 2 ♦/
/* second type */
/* type 2 produces 3 ♦/
/♦ third type */





/♦ first type */
/* second type ♦/
XI
/* third type */
/♦ second type */






/♦ Do consume decision percentage over goods and types */ 
NSDOCNS=SDOCNS-SNOCNS; /♦ Net strengths of do consume classifiers */









/* Do trade decision percentage over goods and types */
NSD0TR=SD0TR-SN0TR; /♦ Net strengths of do consume classifiers */





































/* second type */









Number of players of each type (select as even) 
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one) 
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 1.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens 





















AVERAGES OF LAST 100.00000 MARKETS □PENNED.
TRADE OF
1_1 1-2 1-3
TYPE I 0.85000000 0.24150000 0.15000000
TYPE II 0.47050000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.58850000 0.0000000 1.0000000
2_1 2-2 2-3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.41950000 0.066500000
TYPE II 0.10000000 0.86450000 0.10000000
TYPE III 0.66700000 0.72300000 1.0000000
3_1 3_2 3-3^
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.63800000 0.58250000
TYPE II 1.0000000 0.45950000 0.59350000
TYPE III 1.0000000 0.90850000 0.60000000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.50900000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.35000000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0035000000 0.98450000 0.012000000
TYPE II 0.45000000 0.0035000000 0.54650000




Number of players of each type (select as even) 
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one 
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 0.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens 

























TYPE I 0.45000000 0.10000000 0.15000000
TYPE II 0.45000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.44950000 0.050000000 1.0000000
2_1 2_2 2_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.50000000 0.10000000
TYPE II 0.50000000 0.40000000 0.15000000
TYPE III 0.90000000 0.63750000 1.0000000
3_1 3_2 3_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.69100000 0.48900000
TYPE II 1.0000000 0.60150000 0.50500000
TYPE III 0.40000000 0.50000000 0.40000000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0040000000 0.95150000 0.044500000
TYPE II 0.46800000 0.0020000000 0.53000000
TYPE III 0.94500000 0.049000000 0.0060000000
XV
♦/
/♦ The disutilities from production for each agent ♦/
N1=20; /* Number of players of each type (select as even) */
N=3*N1; /* The total number of players ♦/
ref=ones(Nl,l)|(Nl+l)*ones(Nl,1)I(2*Nl+l)*ones(Nl,1);
/♦ for referencing purposes */
beta=0.6; /* The discount factor (select between zero and one) */
pr=0.05; /* The probability of mistake ♦/
pim=l; /Imitation*/
pimit=pim*ones(l,N); /* Homogeneous */









U=U1|U2|U3; /* The N by 3 matrix of utilities ♦/
cll=0.1; /♦ The inventory holding costs */











C=C1|C2|C3; /* The N by 3 matrix of costs */
/* Initial strengths will be random */
SD0TR=rndn(N,9); /♦ The strengths of players^ do trade 
classifiers (3x3=9 states) */
/* Times used */
/* The strengths of players> don^t trade 
classifiers */
/* Times used */
/* The strengths of players’ do consume 
classifiers (3 states) */
/* Times used ♦/
/♦ The strengths of players’ don’t consume 
classifiers */
/* Times used ♦/
ST0K=2*ones(Nl,1)I3*ones(Nl,1)Iones(Nl,1); /♦ The beginning pre-trade
inventory vector ♦/
STOKC=ones(N,1); /* Pre-consumption inventory held ♦/
CNS=zeros(N,1); /♦ Most recent consumption indicator. Consumed=l Not=0*/
FINALD=1000; /* Final date —  Number of times market opens */













/♦ The stock distribution recorder */
/* Starting distribution of inventories */
/* The do consume percentage recorder */
XVI
TDIST=zeros(FIHALD,27); /♦ The do trade percentage recorder */
/♦ Initialization part complete. How the market opens */
/* The main loop running over time index t. */ 
t=0;
do while t<(FINALD); 
t=t+l; 
i=l;
do while i<N+l; /♦ i will be matched with a ’learned^ agent ♦/
rtype=rndu(l,l); /* (SPECULATIVE EQH) ♦/
if rtype<l/3;







ltype=2; /* second type comes with either good 1 (41*/,) ♦/
if rndud , 1)< -414; 
lstock=3;




ltype=3; /♦ third type always comes with good 1 */ 
lstock=l; 
endif;
TRADE1=0; /♦ Initialization of trade */
TRADE2=0; /* offer decisions. */
STATEl=3*(ST0K[i]-l)+lstock; /♦ Pre-trade */
if ltype==l; /* he will always carry good 2 (pre-trade) */
if lstock==2;
if (STDK[i]==l) or (ST0K[i]==3);










if ltype==2; /* he will either carry (pre-trade) ♦/
if lstock==l; /♦ good 1 */
if (ST0K[i]==2);
/* (says ‘yes’ only if partner comes with good 1) */
TRADE2=1; 
endif;
elseif lstock==3; /♦ or good 3 ♦/ 
if ( (ST0K[i]==l) or (ST0K[i]==2) );





if ltype==3; /* he will always carry good 1 (pre-trade) */
if lstock==l;





/♦ First, the possibility of imitation ♦/ 
if rnduCl,l)<pimit[i]; /♦ If decides to look around ♦/
/♦ For this state, he emulates the weighted average 







STRADE1=S0C1IT; /* Trade strength —  default: social no trade */
if S0CDT>=S0CUT; /♦ Decision according to social values */
TRADE1=1;
STRADE1=S0CDT; /♦ Trade strength —  change: social do trade */ 
endif;
else; /* No imitation —  own strengths */
STRADEl=SNOTR[i,STATEl]; /* Trade strength —  default: no trade */
/* Now trade offer decisons will be made. Note the bias towards 
trade in case of equality of strengths */ 
if SD0TR[i,STATEl]>= SN0TR[i,STATEl];
TRADE1=1; /* First agent decides ♦/
STRADEl=SDOTR[i,STATEl]; /* Trade strength —  change : do trade */
endif; 
endif;
/♦ Now the possibility of non-deliberate decision ♦/ 
if rnduCl,l)<pr; /* Random choice: Agent i */
if rndud , 1)<0.5 ;
TRADE1=1; /♦ 50 percent trade */
STRADEl=SDOTR[i,STATEl]; 
else;




/* Now strength update of consumption classifiers will be made */ 
if t>l; /♦ Start update at time 2, since no consumption
decision is made for t=l yet. ♦/












/♦ If exchange takes place */ 
/* else, prev. stocks 
















/* Now the consumption decision will be made */
/* (Note the bias towards consuming in case of equal strengths */
/♦ First, the possibility of imitation (consumption strengths) */ 
if rndud ,l)<pimit[i] ; /* If decides to look around ♦/
/♦ For this state (commodity), he acts according to the weighted average 




(SUHCdDOCNS [ref [i] : ref [i] +N1-1,GOODl] -1) +1) ;
SOCNC=SNOCNS[ref[i]:ref[i]+Nl-l,GOODl]>*
(TNOCNS[ref[i]:ref[i]+Nl-l,GOODl]-1)/
(SUMCdNOCNS [ref [i] : ref [i] +N1-1,GOODl] -1 )+l) ;
SC0NS1=S0CNC; /* Consumption strength —  default: social no consume */
CNS[i]=0;
ST0K[i]=ST0KC[i] ; /* Same stock */
if S0CDC>=S0CNC; /* Decision according to social values */
SC0NS1=S0CDC; /* Consumption strength —  change: social no consume */ 
CNS[i]=l;
/+ first type ♦/
/♦ type 1 produces 2 */
/♦ second type */
/* type 2 produces 3 ♦/
/* third type ♦/









else; /♦ no imitation ♦/ 
if SDOCNS[i,STOKC[i]]>=SNOCNS[i,STOKC[i]] ;
CNS[i]=l; /♦ do consume */
SC0NSl=SD0CNS[i,STOKC[i]]; /♦ its value (strength) */
if i<=20; /* first type ♦/
ST0K[i]=2; /* type 1 produces 2 ♦/
elseif i<=40; /* second type ♦/
ST0K[i]=3; /* type 2 produces 3 ♦/
else; /♦ third type */




ST0K[i]=ST0KC[i] ; /♦ Same stock */
XIX
SC0NS1=SN0C1IS [i ,STOKC[i]] ; /* its value (strength) */
endif; 
endif;
/* Now the possibility of non-deliberate decision */ 








/♦ first type */
/♦ type 1 produces 2 ♦/
/♦ second type */
/* type 2 produces 3 */
/* third type */
/♦ type 3 produces 1 ♦/
/* don^t consume ♦/ 
/* its value (strength) */ 
/* Same stock ♦/
/♦do consume */ 










/* Now, update of trade classifier strengths ♦/ 









i=i+l; /* Next agent... */
endo;
/* Now records for reporting purposes */
/♦ Stock distribution */









/♦ Do consume decision percentage over goods and types */ 
NSDOCNS=SDOCNS-SNOCNS; /* Net strengths of do consume classifiers */
/* second type ♦/
/* third type ♦/
CDIST Et,1]=SUMC(NSDOCNS El:N1,1].>=0)/N1 
CDIST Et,2]=SUHC(NSDOCNS El:N1,2].>=0)/N1 
CDIS T Et,3]=SUHC(NSDOCNS E1:N1,3].>=0)/N1 
CDIST Et,4]=SUHC(NSDOCNS ENl+1:2+Nl,1].>=0)/N1 
CDIST Et,5]=SUHC(NSDOCNS ENl+1:2*N1,2].>=0)/N1 
CDISTEt,6]=SUHC(NSDOCNSENl+1:2^N1,3].>=0)/Nl 
CDISTEt,7]=SUHC(NSDOCNSE2+N1+1:3*N1,1].>=0)/Nl 
CDIST Et,8]=SUHC(NSDOCNS E2+N1+1:3+Nl,2].>=0)/N1 
CDISTEt,9]=SUHC(NSD0CNSE2*N1+1:3*N1,3].>=0)/Nl
/* first type ♦/
/♦ second type */
/* third type ♦/
XX
/* second type */
/* third type */
/* Do trade decision percentage over goods and types */ 
NSD0TR=SD0TR-SN0TR; /* Net strengths of do consume classifiers */




























/♦Get the last 100 averages of inventory stock distribution*/ 
S0N1=ZER0S(3,9);
SONlCl,.] = (SUHC(TDIST C(FINALD-AVR+1);FINALD,1:9]))>/AVR;
S0N1C2,.]=(SUHC(TDISTC(FINALD-AVR+1):FINALD,10:18]))>/AVR;












Number of players of each type (select as even) 
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one) 
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 1.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens 





















AVERAGES OF LAST 100,.00000 MARKETS □PENNED.
TRADE OF
1_1 1-2 1-3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.050000000 0.30000000
TYPE II 0.59200000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.49400000 0.0000000 1.0000000
2_1 2_2 2_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.23800000 1.0000000
TYPE II 0.90000000 0.95000000 0.67650000
TYPE III 0.90900000 0.20000000 1.0000000
3_1 3_2 3_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.049000000 0.19500000
TYPE II 1.0000000 1.0000000 0.49550000
TYPE III 0.15000000 0.10000000 0.91600000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.30000000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0045000000 0.69350000 0.30200000
TYPE II 0.53750000 0.0085000000 0.45400000




Number of players of each type (select as even) 
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one) 
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 0.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens 





















AVERAGES OF LAST 100,.00000 MARKETS □PENNED.
TRADE OF
1>1 1_2 1_3
TYPE I 0.75000000 0.050000000 0.10000000
TYPE II 0.40050000 1.0000000 0.050000000
TYPE III 0.50000000 0.0000000 1.0000000
2_1 2_2 2_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.55000000 0.90000000
TYPE II 0.48950000 0.25000000 0.32300000
TYPE III 0.80000000 0.49100000 1.0000000
3_1 3_2 3_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.27350000 0.70000000
TYPE II 0.95000000 1.0000000 0.61000000
TYPE III 0.55000000 0.25000000 0.40000000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0050000000 0.75700000 0.23800000
TYPE II 0.48750000 0.0060000000 0.50650000
TYPE III 0.97900000 0.018000000 0.0030000000
XXIII
A P P E N D IX  C
Programs and Results of Kiyotaki and Wright Part:
When we look at the table of outputs for trade and consumption, we get 
the proportion of players who decide to do action at the last time period. In 
the trade table, i-j means trade for good i in return to good j. For example, 
when we look at the row for type 1 player and column for 2-3, we get the 
proportion of type 1 players who decide to do trade good 2 in return to good 
3. In the consumption table, the rows give us the type of players and columns 
give us the type of goods. In the stok table, the distribution of holding goods 
for each type of players is given.
1. Computer Program: Fundamental Equilibrium
2. Output: Fundamental Equilibrium and Full Imitation Case
3. Output: Fundamental Equilibrium and No Imitation Case
4. Output: Speculative Equilibrium and Full Imitation Case
5. Output: Speculative Equilibrium and No Imitation Case
XXIV
♦/
/♦ The disutilities from production for each agent */
N1=20; /* Number of players of each type (select as even) */
N=3*N1; /* The total number of players */
ref=ones(Nl,1)|(Nl+l)*ones(Nl,1)|(2*Nl+l)*ones(Nl,1);
/♦ for referencing purposes ♦/
beta=0.6; /* The discount factor (select between zero and one) */
pr=0.05; /* The probability of mistake */
pim=l;
pimit=pim*ones(l,N); /* Homogeneous */









U=U1|U2|U3; /♦ The N by 3 matrix of utilities ♦/
cll=0.1; /* The inventory holding costs */











C=CllC2|C3; /* The N by 3 matrix of costs ♦/
/* Initial strengths will be random */
SD0TR=rndn(N,9); /* The strengths of players^ do trade 
classifiers (3x3=9 states) */
/* Times used */
/♦ The strengths of players^ don’t trade 
classifiers ♦/
/♦ Times used ♦/
/* The strengths of players’ do consume 
classifiers (3 states) ♦/
/* Times used */
/♦ The strengths of players’ don’t consume 
classifiers */
/♦ Times used */
ST0K=2*ones(Nl,1)I3»ones(Nl,1)Iones(Nl,1); /♦ The beginning pre-trade
inventory vector ♦/
STOKC=ones(N,1); /* Pre-consumption inventory held */
CNS=ones(N,l); /♦ Host recent consumption indicator. Consumed=l Not=0*/
FINALD=1000; /* Final date —  Number of times market opens ♦/
AVR=100;
/♦ The stock distribution recorder */












CDIST=zeros(FINALD,9); /* The do consume percentage recorder ♦/
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TDIST=zeros(FINALD ,27); /♦ The do trade percentage recorder */
/* Initialization part complete. Bow the market opens ♦/
/* The main loop running over time index t. */ 
t=0;
do while t<FIBALD; 
t=t+l;
/* First thing is the pairwise matching of the players.
This will be done by first generating independent uniform random 
numbers between zero and one for each agent. This will determine the 
rank of the agent. The highest valued agent will be assigned rank one, 
the next high value rank 2, etc.The ranks will be stored in the vector 
AGENT ill the prescribed order. Then following the order in AGENT, 
the neighboring players will be matched. */
/* Initialization ♦/










do while i<B; /* AGEBT[i] and AGEBT[i+l] are matched ♦/
TRADE1=1; /* Initialization of trade ♦/
TRADE2=1; /* offer decisions. ♦/
STATEl=3*(ST0K[AGEBT[i]]-l)+ST0K[AGEBT[i+l]]; /* Pre-trade */
STATE2=3*(ST0K[AGEBT[i+l]]-l)+ST0K[AGEBT[i]]; /* states. ♦/
/♦ First, the possibility of imitation ♦/
/* First agent first */
if rndud , l)<pimit [agent [i]] ; /* If decides to look around */
/* For this state, he adopts the weighted average 













/* Second agent next ♦/
if rnduCl,l)<pimit[agent[i+1]]; /* If decides to look around ♦/
/♦ Similar update for the second agent ♦/ 
SOCDT=SUHC(SDOTR[ref[AGEBT[i+l]]: ref[AGENT[i+1]]+Bl-l,STATE2].♦
(TDOTR[ref[AGENT[i+1]]: ref[AGENT[i+1]]+B1-1,STATE2]-1))/ 













/♦ Preperations for trade */
STRADE1=SD0TR[AGENT[i],STATE1] ; /*
STRADE2=SD0TR [AGENT[i+1],STATE2]; /*
/* Now trade offer decisons will be made. Note the bias towards 
trade in case of equality of strengths ♦/ 
if SDOTR[AGENT[i],STATE1]< SNOTR[AGENT[i],STATE1];








/* Now the possibility of non-deliberate decision */ 
if rndud ,l)<pr; /* Random choice: Agent i */
if rndu(l,lX0.5;
TRADE1=1; /♦ 50 percent trade ♦/
STRADEl=SDOTR[AGENT[i],STATE1]; 
else ;




if rnduCl,l)<pr; /* Random choice: Agent i+1 */
if rndud , 1)<0 - 5 ;
TRADE2=1; /* 50 percent trade */
STRADE2=SD0TR[AGENT[i+l],STATE2]; 
else ;




/♦ Now strength update of consumption classifiers will be made */ 
if t>l; /* Start update at time 2, since no consumption 
decision is made for t=l yet. */










SNOCNS [AGENT [i] , STOKC [AGENT [i] ] ] =SNOCNS [AGENT [i] , STOKC [AGENT [i] ] ]
-(1/(TNOCNS[AGENT[i],STOKC[AGENT[i]]]+1))






















=TNOCNS[AGENT[i+1],STOKC[AGENT[i+1]] ] +1 ; 
endif; 
endif;
/* Now back to the trade round ♦/
TRADE=TRADE1*TRADE2; 
if TRADE==1;
STOKC[AGENT[i]]=STOK[AGENT[i+1]]; /* If exchange takes place ♦/
STOKC[AGENT [i+1]]=ST0K[AGENT[i]]; 
else; /♦ else, prev. stocks ♦/
STOKC[AGENT[i]]=ST0K[AGENT[i]]; /* are kept. ♦/
STOKC[AGENT[i+1]]=STOK[AGENT[i+1]]; 
endif;
/* Now the consumption decision will be made */
/* (Note the bias towards consuming in case of equal strengths ♦/
/* First, the possibility of imitation (consumption strengths) */
/* First agent first */
if rndud , l)<pimit [agent [i]] ; /* If decides to look around ♦/
/♦ For this state (commodity), he acts according to the weighted average 










CNS[AGENT[i]]=0; /* don’t consume ♦/
SC0NS1=S0CNC; /♦ its value (social strength) */
else ;
CNS[AGENT[i]]=1 ; /* do consume ♦/
SC0NS1=S0CDC; /* its value (social strength) ♦/ 
endif;
else; /* Consider own strengths — not social ones */
if SDOCNS[AGENT[i],STOKC[AGENT[i]]]<SN0CNS[AGENT[i],STOKC[AGENT[i]]] ;
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/♦ don^t consume */
/+ its value (strength) */
/* do consume */
/* its value (strength) */
CHS[AGENT[i]]=0;






/♦ Second agent next */
if rndud , l)<pimit [agent [i+1]] ; /* If decides to look around */








CNS[AGENT[i+1]]=0; /♦ don’t consume ♦/
SC0NS2=S0CNC; /* its value (social strength) ♦/
else ;
CNS[AGENT[i+l]]=l; /* do consume */




CNS[AGENT[i+1]]=0; /* don’t consume */






if CNS[AGENT[i]]==1; /♦ If decided to consume */
if AGENT[i]<=Nl; /* first type */
ST0K[AGENT[i]]=2; /* type 1 produces 2 */
elseif AGENT[i]<=2*N1; /♦ second type */
STOK[AGENT[i]]=3; /♦ type 2 produces 3 */
/♦ third type ♦/
/* type 3 produces 1 */
/* do consume */
/* its value (strength) ♦/
/* If decided not to consume */







if CNS[AGENT[i+1]]==1; /* If decided to consume */
if AGENT[i+1]<=N1; /* first type */
STOK[AGENT[i+1]]=2; /* type 1 produces 2 */
elseif AGENT[i+1]<=2*N1; /♦ second type ♦/
STOK[AGENT[i+1]]=3; /* type 2 produces 3 */
/* third type ♦/







/* Now the possibility of non-deliberate decision */
/* If decided not to consume */
/* Saune stock ♦/
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/♦ don’t consume ♦/
/* its value (strength) */ 
/♦ Same stock ♦/
/♦ do consume ♦/
/* its value (strength) */
/* don’t consume */
/* its value (strength) ♦/ 
/* Same stock ♦/
/* do consume */
/♦ its value (strength) */








if-AGENT[i]<=N1 ; /* first type ♦/
STOK[AGENT[i]]=2; /♦ type 1 produces 2 */
elseif AGENT[i]<=2*N1; /* second type ♦/
STOK[AGENT[i]]=3; /♦ type 2 produces 3 */
else; /* third type ♦/




if rndud,l)<pr; /* Random choice: Agent i+1 */ 







if AGENT[i+1]<=N1; /♦ first type ♦/
ST0K[AGENT[i+l]]=2; /♦ type 1 produces 2 */
elseif AGENT[i+1]<=2+Nl ; /* second type */
STOK[AGENT[i+1]]=3; /* type 2 produces 3 */
else; /* third type ♦/




/* Now, update of trade classifier strengths */ 
if TRADE1==1; /♦ Agent i ♦/
SDOTR[AGENT[i],STATE1]=SD0TR[AGENT[i],STATE1]




-d/(TNOTR[AGENT[i] ,STATE1]+1))*(SNOTR[AGENT[i] .STATEl]-SCONSl) ; 
TNOTR[AGENT[i],STATEl]=TNOTR[AGENT[i],STATE1]+1; 
endif;
if TRADE2==1; /♦ Agent i+1 */
SDOTR[AGENT[i+l] ,STATE2]=SD0TR[AGENT[i+l] .STATE2]




-d/(TNOTR[AGENT[i+l] ,STATE2]+l))*(SN0TR[AGENT[i+l] ,STATE2]-SC0NS2) ; 
TNOTR[AGENT[i+l] ,STATE2]=TN0TR[AGENT[i+1] ,STATE2]+1; 
endif;
i=i+2; /♦ Skip one agent since that is already processed. */
endo ;
XXX
/♦ second type */
/* third type */
/* second type ♦/
/♦ third type ♦/
/♦ Now records for reporting purposes */
/* Stock distribution */









/* Do consume decision percentage over goods and types */ 
NSDOCNS=SDOCNS-SNOCNS; /* Net strengths of do consume classifiers */









/* Do trade decision percentage over goods and types */
NSD0TR=SD0TR“SN0TR; /* Net strengths of do consume classifiers ♦/




























/♦Get the last 100 averages of inventory stock distribution*/
S0N1=ZER0S(3,9);
SONlCl,.]=(SUMC(TDISTC(FINALD-AVR+1)iFINALD,1:9]))>/AVR;
/* second type */























Number of players of each type (select as even) 
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one) 
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 1.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens 





















AVERAGES OF LAST 100.00000 MARKETS OPENNED.
TRADE OF
1-1 1-2 1-3
TYPE I 0.87700000 0.050000000 0.27700000
TYPE II 0.15000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.58550000 0.0000000 1.0000000
2_1 2-2 2_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.73650000 0.07100000Q
TYPE II 0.74700000 0.90000000 0.40000000
TYPE III 0.52050000 0.57350000 1.0000000
3_1 3_2 3_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.24500000 0.54250000
TYPE II 1.0000000 0.35000000 0.50350000
TYPE III 0.91300000 0.80000000 0.80000000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.65150000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.25000000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0035000000 0.99050000 0.0060000000
TYPE II 0.47250000 0.0045000000 0.52300000




Number of players of each type (select as even) 
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one) 
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 0.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens 





















AVERAGES OF LAST 100 .00000 MARKETS OPENNED.
TRADE OF
1_1 1_2 1_3
TYPE I 0.50000000 0.050000000 0.25000000
TYPE II 0.40000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.70000000 0.10000000 1.0000000
2_1 2_2 2_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.50100000 0.0000000
TYPE II 0.40000000 0.55000000 0.40000000
TYPE III 0.80000000 0.42400000 1.0000000
3_1 3.2 3_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.57850000 0.38600000
TYPE II 1.0000000 0.99950000 0.44900000
TYPE III 0.60000000 0.25000000 0.50000000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0025000000 0.98400000 0.013500000
TYPE II 0.46300000 0.0050000000 0.53200000




Number of players of each type (select as even) 
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one) 
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 1.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens 





















AVERAGES OF LAST 100,.00000 MARKETS □PENNED.
TRADE OF
1_1 1_2 1-3
TYPE I 0.95000000 0.20000000 0.25000000
TYPE II 0.40500000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.40000000 0.0000000 1.0000000
2_1 2_2 2_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.46700000 1.0000000
TYPE II 0.82650000 0.80000000 0.15000000
TYPE III 0.72400000 0.51750000 0.95000000
3_1 3_2 3_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.60000000'
TYPE II 1.0000000 1.0000000 0.11250000
TYPE III 0.10000000 0.15000000 0.75150000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.46100000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0020000000 0.69850000 0.29950000
TYPE II 0.53550000 0.0080000000 0.45650000




Number of players of each type (select as even)
The total number of players 60.000000
The discount factor (select between zero and one)
The probability of mistake 0.050000000
Probability of Imitation 0.0000000
Final date —  Number of times market opens





















AVERAGES OF LAST 100,.00000 MARKETS □PENNED.
TRADE OF
1_1 1-2 1-3
TYPE I 0.60000000 0.11750000 0.25000000
TYPE II 0.50000000 1.0000000 0.050000000
TYPE III 0.35000000 0.20000000 1.0000000
2_1 2_2 2_3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.58800000 0.75000000
TYPE II 0.45000000 0.70000000 0.15000000
TYPE III 0.82400000 0.48400000 0.95000000
3«1 3_2 3_3
TYPE I 0.95000000 0.65000000 0.46100000
TYPE II 1.0000000 1.0000000 0.68550000
TYPE III 0.45000000 0.15000000 0.65000000
CONSUMPTION
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 1.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE II 0.0000000 1.0000000 0.0000000
TYPE III 0.0000000 0.0000000 1.0000000
STOK
GOODl G00D2 G00D3
TYPE I 0.0045000000 0.75800000 0.23750000
TYPE II 0.49400000 0.0070000000 0.49900000
TYPE III 0.87750000 0.11400000 0.0085000000
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APPENDIX D
Graphics of Dynamic Optimization Part: (100 RUNS)
In the graphics of the density functions, y-axis gives us the proportion of 
runs for each periods, x-axis gives us the acceptance ratio of players’ decisions 
for the periods of 10, 40, 160, 640 and 1000. For example if the acceptance 
ratio is equal to 1, all the players will accept the decision, if it is between 0.9 
and 1, between 90 percent and 100 percent of players in a game, will accept 
the decision.
In the graphics of the stok distribution functions, time plot of means and 
standard deviations of players holding goods are given for the periods of 10, 
20, 40, 80, 160, 320, 640 and 1000.
1. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-fun. eq. full 
imit.
2. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-fun. eq. half 
imit.
3. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-fun. eq. no imit.
4. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-fun. eq. full 
imit.
5. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-fun. eq. half 
imit.
6. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-fun. eq. no imit.
7. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 1-fun. eq. full 
imit.
8. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 1-fun. eq. half 
imit.
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9. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 1-fun. eq. no imit.
10. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-spec. eq. full 
imit.
11. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-spec. eq. half 
imit.
12. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-spec. eq. no 
imit.
13. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-spec. eq. full 
imit.
14. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-spec. eq. half 
imit.
15. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-spec. eq. no 
imit.
16. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. full 
imit.
17. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. half 
imit.
18. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. no 
imit.
19. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 1-spec. eq. full 
imit.
20. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 1-spec. eq. half 
imit.




Graphics of Kiyotaki and Wright Part: (100 RUNS)
In the graphics of the density functions, y-axis gives us the proportion of 
runs for each periods, x-axis gives us the acceptance ratio of players’ decisions 
for the periods of 10, 40, 160, 640 and 1000. For example if the acceptance 
ratio is equal to 1, all the players will accept the decision, if it is between 0.9 
and 1, between 90 percent and 100 percent of players in a game, will accept 
the decision.
In the graphics of the stok distribution functions, time plot of means and 
standard deviations of players holding goods are given for the periods of 10, 
20, 40, 80, 160, 320, 640 and 1000.
1. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-fun. eq. full 
imit.
2. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-fun. eq. half 
imit.
3. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-fun. eq. no imit.
4. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-fun. eq. full 
imit.
5. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-fun. eq. half 
imit.
6. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-fun. eq. no imit.
7. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-fun. eq. full 
imit.
8. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-fun. eq. half 
imit.
9. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-fun. eq. no imit.
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10. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-fun. eq. full 
imit.
11. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-fun. eq. half 
imit.
12. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-fun. eq. no imit.
13. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-fun. eq. full 
imit.
14. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-fun. eq. half 
imit.
15. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-fun. eq. no imit.
16. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-fun. eq. full 
imit.
17. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-fun. eq. half 
imit.
18. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-fun. eq. no imit.
19. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-fun. eq. full 
imit.
20. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1' For Good 3-fun. eq. half 
imit.
21. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-fun. eq. no imit.
22. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 2-fun. eq. full 
imit.
23. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 2-fun. eq. half 
imit.
24. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 2-fun. eq. no imit.
25. Density of Type 2 Player For Consumption of Good 2-fun. eq. full 
imit.
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26. Density of Type 2 Player For Consumption of Good 2-fun. eq. half 
imit.
27. Density of Type 2 Player For Consumption of Good 2-fun. eq. no imit.
28. Density of Type 3 Player For Consumption of Good 3-fun. eq. full 
imit.
29. Density of Type 3 Player For Consumption of Good 3-fun. eq. half 
imit.
30. Density of Type 3 Player For Consumption of Good 3-fun. eq. no imit.
31. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 2-fun. eq. full imit.
32. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 2-fun. eq. half imit.
33. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 2-fun. eq. no imit.
34. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 3-fun. eq. full imit.
35. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 3-fun. eq. half imit.
36. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 3-fun. eq. no imit.
37. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 1-fun. eq. full imit.
38. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 1-fun. eq. half imit.
39. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 1-fun. eq. no imit.
40. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 3-fun. eq. full imit.
41. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 3-fun. eq. half imit.
42. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 3-fun. eq. no imit.
43. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 1-fun. eq. full imit.
44. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 1-fun. eq. half imit.
45. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 1-fun. eq. no imit.
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46. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 2-fun. eq. full imit.
47. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 2-fun. eq. half imit.
48. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 2-fun. eq. no imit.
49. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-spec. eq. full
imit.
.50. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-spec. eq. half 
imit.
51. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 1-spec. eq. no 
imit.
52. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-spec. eq. full 
imit.
53. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-spec. eq. half 
imit.
54. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 2 For Good 3-spec. eq. no 
imit.
55. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. full 
imit.
56. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. half 
imit.
57. Density of Type 1 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. no 
imit.
58. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-spec. eq. full 
imit.
59. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-spec. eq. half 
imit.
60. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-spec. eq. no 
imit.
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61. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-spec. eq. full 
imit.
62. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-spec. eq. half 
imit.
63. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-spec. eq. no 
imit.
64. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. full 
imit.
65. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. half 
imit.
66. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 1-spec. eq. no 
imit.
67. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 2-spec. eq. full 
imit.
68. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 2-spec. eq. half 
imit.
69. Density of Type 2 Player Trading Good 3 For Good 2-spec. eq. no 
imit.
70. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-spec. eq. full 
imit.
71. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-spec. eq. half 
imit.
72. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 2-spec. eq. no 
imit.
73. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-spec. eq. full 
imit.
74. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-spec. eq. half 
imit.
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75. Density of Type 3 Player Trading Good 1 For Good 3-spec. eq. no 
imit.
76. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 2-spec. eq. full 
imit.
77. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 2-spec. eq. half 
imit.
78. Density of Type 1 Player For Consumption of Good 2-spec. eq. no 
imit.
79. Density of Type 2 Player For Consumption of Good 2-spec. eq. full 
imit.
80. Density of Type 2 Player For Consumption of Good 2-spec. eq. half 
imit.
81. Density of Type 2 Player For Consumption of Good 2-spec. eq. no 
imit.
82. Density of Type 3 Player For Consumption of Good 3-spec. eq. full 
imit.
83. Density of Type 3 Player For Consumption of Good 3-spec. eq. half 
imit.
84. Density of Type 3 Player For Consumption of Good 3-spec. eq. no 
imit.
85. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 2-spec. eq. full imit.
86. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 2-spec. eq. half imit.
87. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 2-spec. eq. no imit.
88. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 3-spec. eq. full imit.
89. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 3-spec. eq. half imit.
90. Stok Distribution of Type 1 Player Holding Good 3-spec. eq. no imit.
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91. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 1-spec. eq. full imit.
92. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 1-spec. eq. half imit.
93. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 1-spec. eq. no imit.
94. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 3-spec. eq. full imit.
95. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 3-spec. eq. half imit.
96. Stok Distribution of Type 2 Player Holding Good 3-spec. eq. no imit.
97. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 1-spec. eq. full imit.
98. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 1-spec. eq. half imit.
99. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 1-spec. eq. no imit.
100. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 2-spec. eq. full imit.
101. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 2-spec. eq. half imit.
102. Stok Distribution of Type 3 Player Holding Good 2-spec. eq. no imit.
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DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq._half imit.
> 0 .4
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
>  0.4
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._no imit.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 1-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
> 0 .4
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 1-fun. eq._half imit.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 1-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
>- 0.4
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq.Jull imit.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._half imit.
> 0 .4
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq.Jull imit.





0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 1-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 1-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 1-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
>. 0.5
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._half imit.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-fun. eq.Jull imit.
>  0.4
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-fun. eq._half imit.
>  0.4
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq.Jull Imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._no imit.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq._half imit.
>-0.5
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 3-fun. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 3-fun. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 3-fun. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - fun. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - fun. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - fun. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - fun. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - fun. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - fun. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - fun. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - fun. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - fun. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - fun. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - fun. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - fun. eq._no imit.
TIME
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - fun. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - fun. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - fun. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - fun. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - fun. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - fun. eq._no imit.
TIME
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 2 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq.Jull imit.





0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 1-spec. eq._half imit.
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DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 3 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 2-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER TRADING GOOD 1 FOR GOOD 3-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 1 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 2 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 2-spec. eq._no imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 3-spec. eq.Jull imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
DENSITY OF TYPE 3 PLAYER FOR CONSUMPTION OF GOOD 3-spec. eq._half imit.
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION






0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
ACCEPTANCE RATIO OF THE DECISION
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - spec. eq.Jull imit.
TIME
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - spec. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - spec. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - spec. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - spec. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 1 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - spec. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - spec. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - spec. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - spec. eq._no imit.
TIME
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - spec. eq.Jull imit.
TIME
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - spec. eq._half imit.
TIME
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 2 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 3 - spec. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - spec. eq.Jull imit.
TIME
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - spec. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 1 - spec. eq._no imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - spec. eq.Jull imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - spec. eq._half imit.
STOK DIST. OF TYPE 3 PLAYER HOLDING GOOD 2 - spec. eq._no imit.
